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TOWARD GUIDELINES FOR MERGER
REMEDIES
Albert A. Foert
INTRODUCTION

The remedial aspects of merger enforcement activity have been
the subject of close scrutiny and fresh thinking over the past few
years. In August 1999, the Federal Trade Commission ("FrC")
released its staff Study of the Commission's Divestiture Process with
its analysis of factors that may explain why some orders have been
more successful than others in addressing competitive concerns. The
Study also suggested "best practices" for future consideration, such as
requiring upfront designation of an acceptable buyer in appropriate
cases and reviewing the buyer's business plan with respect to the
assets being divested.1 Several months later, in two speeches
receiving widespread coverage, Chairman Robert Pitofsky offered his
views on (1) why there is "no more important set of policy questions
facing the antitrust community than defining the nature and limits of
appropriate restructuring in merger review," 2 and (2) "what factors
the FTC should rely upon in deciding whether and to what extent
restructuring can save an otherwise anti-competitive transaction." 3 In
May 2000, Richard Parker and David Balto deepened the dialogue
with their thoughtful article on The Evolving Approach to Merger
Remedies,4 which concluded with several "going forward"
suggestions, such as a strong preference for divestiture of an ongoing
business rather than more limited or "mix-and-match" arrangements
t Mr. Foer is President of the American Antitrust Institute ("AAr'), Washington, D.C.
The author gratefully acknowledges input from Gail Conlon, Kenneth Davidson, Daniel Ducore,
John Kwoka, Robert Lande, Mary Lou Steptoe, Spencer Wailer, and especially Robert Skitol.
I BUREAU OF COMPErION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTIrURE PROCESS (1999), available at http:lwww.ftc.govlosl1999/9908/divestiture.pdf
(ast visited Oct. 15, 2001).
2 Jaret Sieberg, FTC Chief Wants Divestiture Guidelines, THE DAILY DEAL, Dec. 16,
1999, at 1.
3 Robert Pitofsky, The Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks
at the Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference Law Seminars International, at
http'//www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm (Feb. 17, 2000).
4 Richard Parker & David Balto, The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies,
ANTrrRUST REP., May 2000, at 2.
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and more frequent use of interim trustees.5 In August 2001,
Chairman Timothy Muris expressed his view that "[a]n effective
remedy is a fundamental part of merger enforcement 6 and his
commitment to "a divestiture that will likely create a viable business
entity (rather than a creation of lawyers) to resolve the competitive
problems posed" by any merger under review.
The attention devoted to this subject has thrown a spotlight
upon a central reality of merger enforcement activity at both of the
federal antitrust agencies that the Bush administration's appointees
have inherited. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 19768 ("HSR") has had the largely unanticipated effect of moving
the merger law development and enforcement policy process from a
regime of post hoc adjudication to ad hoc regulation and pre hoc
administrative negotiation. Today, relatively few merger cases are
litigated, and a new body of administrative law has consequently
evolved outside of the judiciary's sight.9 To a large extent, the
antitrust treatment of mergers is driven by a step-by-step application
of the principles in the HorizontalMerger Guidelines.10 This is not to
say there is anything like strict adherence to the Guidelines'
prescriptions, for it is apparent that substantial discretion is exercised
in their application. In vast areas unaddressed by the Guidelines,
however, largely unreviewed administrative discretion is exercised on
a day-to-day basis without formal structure. Nowhere is this more
substantively important than in the handling of deal restructuring,
because the standard is to fix anticompetitive components rather than
litigate. Negotiations over fixes take place under the powerful lever
5

Id. at 24.

Timothy Muris, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a
Word-Continuity, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (emphasis in
original), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.htm (Aug. 7, 2001).
7 Speech by Timothy Muris, supra note 6, at http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
murisaba.htm. As we go to press, Assistant Attorney General Charles James has announced a
new "Merger Review Process Initiative" to focus on "early identification of issues" and
"negotiation of investigation plans," aimed at streamlining the entire merger review exercise and
thereby reducing burdens confronting all parties involved. See Press Release, Antitrust Division
Releases Details of Merger Review Process Initiative, at http:llwww.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/pressreleases/2001/9305.htm (Oct. 12, 2001). For a copy of the Initiative, see DEP'T
6

OF

JUSTICE,

MERGER

REVIEW

PROCESS

INITIATIVE,

at

http://www.usdoj.govlatrl

public/9300.htm (Oct. 12, 2001).
' Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994 & Supp.
V 1999)).
9 See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1399 (1998) ("Under this system only a tiny
handful of transactions are ever challenged in court by either agency."). See generally William
J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-RodinoAct,
65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825 (1997) (noting that more merger litigation, particularly at the appellate
level, would be helpful for the continued evolution of merger guidelines).
10

DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (rev.

ed. 1997) reprintedin 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

13,104, at 20,569 (1998).
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of the threat of litigation and delay but without any meaningful public
input.
More specifically on that last point, neither published FTC
"analyses" of proposed consent orders nor Department of Justice
("DOJ") "competitive impact statements" filed with proposed consent
decrees offer insight into trade-offs accepted during negotiations or
reasons for accepting settlements that may differ in important respects
from settlements in other apparently similar cases. The FTC
occasionally receives comments on its proposed orders but does not
publish its responses to them; DOJ publishes responses to comments
received on its proposed decrees as required by the Antitrust Practice
and Procedure Act of 1974 ("Tunney Act")," but its responses rarely
address the comments in an informative fashion. Indeed, DOJ
outcomes are often revealed in only the most cursory terms in press
releases that are unaccompanied by consent decrees, thereby
circumventing the public scrutiny intended by the Tunney Act.
I believe the time has come to consider a more structured and
transparent approach to the remedial phase of the merger review
process. The vehicle I suggest is the promulgation of Horizontal
MergerRemedy Guidelines. Part I of this paper explains my thinking
in this regard. Part II highlights the main elements of the attached set
of draft guidelines for this purpose.
I. CHANNELING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: THE TASK AHEAD
Broad administrative discretion can be a good thing, especially
early in a governmental program when the best patterns of practice
have not yet become manifest. But, sooner or later, it becomes
prudent to narrow administrative discretion in the interests of assuring
"discretionary justice" (in the words of administrative law expert
Kenneth Culp Davis) through a structured framework. In the case of
merger enforcement, this should take the form of (1) studying
enforcement patterns, (2) deriving best practices, (3) formalizing
rules, (4) providing transparency so that the public can understand
and evaluate decisions being made, and (5) conducting regular post
hoe evaluations to determine how well the program is working.
As already noted, the FTC Divestiture Study followed by the
Pitofsky speeches and the Parker-Balto article had the effect of
inviting the antitrust community to begin the process of structuring
the enforcement agencies' discretion. A next step was actual
application of core recommendations from those initiatives, a process
Chairman Muris appeared to endorse in his August 2001 address to
1 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-258, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706
(1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16).
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the ABA. This may in part be a matter of self-protection. As agency
resources become increasingly stretched and as restructuring
proposals become more complicated, the need grows for streamlining
the negotiating process and even declaring that certain restructurings
are too taxing for the agencies to consider. Sometimes the agencies
should just say no. I now outline my thoughts on further steps down
this same path.
First, there is a need for more and better analysis of past
restructurings. The FTC Divestiture Study was a commendable start
in this direction but it insufficiently framed the core question under
review: "whether the buyer of the divested assets was able to enter the
market and maintain operations." The broader and more critical
questions for future study are how well the divested assets performed
over time compared to how they were performing prior to divestiture,
and whether the buyer supplied real competition or merely cooperated
in coordinated interaction or sat under the price-setting umbrella of
the merged firm. Did the divested enterprise earn operating profits?
Did it gain or lose market share? Did it constrain the merged firm's
pricing, and did it contribute to innovation activity in the market
generally? What is the realistic prognosis for its sales and earnings in
the years ahead?
In the proposed acquisition of Pathmark by Royal Ahold, the
American Antitrust Institute provided the FTC data based on a study
by economist Ronald W. Cotterill in which he examined the
effectiveness of Royal Ahold's divestitures in prior mergers.' 2 His
data showed that in some markets the divested supermarkets were3
performing twenty-five percent below stores that were not divested.
This would not seem to reflect a successful restructuring, even though
divested supermarkets were maintaining operations. Thus, additional
empirical work would be useful for shaping future restructurings.
Second, as noted, I believe the time has come for focused
consideration of Horizontal Merger Remedy Guidelines as an
addendum to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In this paper and its
attachment, I propose a working draft for them. The logical next step
would be for the agencies to initiate one or more workshops for the
public to comment on this draft or some similar document, and to
consider whether it is in the public interest to go in this direction.
Here are twelve questions raised by the remedy dialogue over
the course of the past three years and now warranting more deliberate
12

Press Release, American Antitrust Institute, American Antitrust Institute Warns FTC

of Dangers in Supermarket Mergers, Urges Careful Scrutiny of Ahold Acquisitions in
Northeast, at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/32.cfm (June 18, 1999).
13 See Letter from Albert A. Foer, American Antitrust Institute, to Robert Pitofsky, FTC
Chairman, at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/ recent/32.cfm (June 18, 1999).

2001]

TOWARD GUIDELINES FOR MERGER REMEDIES

attention: (1) Is it the agencies' obligation to assure that a merger will
not result in any reduction of competition? (2) Who should bear the
risk of a failed divestiture, the parties seeking to merge or consumers?
(3) Should the standard be to approve any reasonably acceptable
buyer or to select one likely to restore competition? (4) When should
an upfront buyer be required? (5) Should there be a presumption in
favor of spinning off an entire business unit with all required
intellectual property, manufacturing capabilities, marketing network,
other infrastructure (e.g., warehousing facilities), and minimum
efficient scale for advertising, purchasing and other purposes, rather
than partial divestments? (6) When should the agencies accept some
form of behavioral relief? (7) When should the agencies permit
entangling arrangements between the merged firm and the acquirer of
the divested assets and, -ifso, should there be time limits on them? (8).
When should the agencies accept informal relief unaccompanied by a
binding consent decree or order? (9) At what point does a deal that
plainly requires massive and disruptive divestitures to address
antitrust concerns warrant a presumption that the purpose is to acquire
market power by taking apart a rival? (10) What modifications of
agency processes are needed to ensure that remedy issues receive
both early and adequate attention? (11) When should regulatory
remedies (including the use of trustees) be employed? And (12) How
can the public get the information needed to evaluate and provide
input on agency enforcement judgments in this area?
I have not attempted to answer all of these questions, but they
form a backdrop for the proposals that follow.
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II. PROPOSED GUIDELINES

The attached draft presents my proposal for horizontal merger
remedy guidelines. It addresses only market power risks associated
with a merger's elimination of actual or potential competition
between the merging parties. Market power risks associated with a
merger's vertical dimensions may plainly warrant kinds of relief other
than those described in the draft. Vertical dimensions present legal,
policy, and economic analysis issues of growing importance,
particularly in (but by no means limited to) high-technology markets
that exhibit complex network effects. In my view, however, the
antitrust community needs more experience with these kinds of
vertical issues before formal remedy guidelines for them can be
proposed.
Section I of the draft highlights the general principles underlying
the more specific provisions set forth in Sections II and II. Section II
establishes "presumptions" regarding elements of an acceptable
consent order or decree permitting a merger to proceed without
further challenge; Section III establishes conditions under which
merging parties may obtain early consideration of remedy proposals,
and provides incentives for merging parties to invoke the procedures
set forth therein, in the interests of avoiding prolonged investigations
and expediting consummation of the parties' transactions. Let me
briefly explain the thinking behind each of the latter substantive
sections.
A. Remedy Presumptions
The FTC Divestiture Study identified several aspects of past
settlements that materially contributed either to the success or to the
failure of a required divestiture in terms of the overriding objectives
of eliminating market power risks and ensuring, a post-merger
competitive environment.1 4 Section II of my proposed guidelines
represents my effort to crystallize the learning from that report into
presumptions about necessary elements of an effective horizontal
merger remedy.

14

See

BUREAU OF COMPETITION,

FED.

TRADE

COMMISSION'S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 15-29 (1999)

COMM'N,

A STUDY

OF THE

(identifying obstacles and successes

gleaned from divestiture case studies), available at http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/1999199081
divestiture.pdf.
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The objective is to clarify what the agencies will need in most
cases to ensure effective relief and thereby expedite the resolution of
enforcement concerns that may otherwise stand in the way of
completing a proposed merger. To the extent these clarifications are
faithful to established and now widely accepted core tenets of U.S.
merger law, the business community should embrace them as
removing or at least reducing obstacles to desirable efficiencyenhancing merger transactions.
Presumptions include the need for (1) divestiture of all material
tangible and intangible assets used by one of the merging parties to
compete in each overlap area of concern with an eye on ensuring
competitive viability; (2) an acceptable divestiture contract with an
acceptable buyer in hand prior to consummation of the parties'
proposed merger when the assets to be divested are less than an
ongoing business; (3) contract provisions inducing employees of the
divested enterprise to become employees of the buyer, restricting the
divesting company's reemployment of those employees, prohibiting
the divesting company's reacquisition of any divested assets, and
providing for the continuation of all necessary third-party
relationships; (4) buyer's possession of sufficient expertise, resources
and incentives to become a vigorous competitor, evidenced by a
meaningful business plan; (5) commitments by both the divesting
party and the buyer of the assets to be divested to submission of
reports on the effectiveness of the remedy two years after the
effective date of the applicable order or decree; and (6) conditions for
appointment of interim and monitor trustees.
My draft recognizes the need for flexibility and, in particular,
circumstances when an agency might appropriately depart from the
presumptions in Section II. I propose, however, that whenever an
agency does so-accepting a remedy that omits any of the elements
generally presumed to be necessary-there will be "a public
explanation of the reasons for its determination that" the omission "is
in the public interest"; and that the explanation "will provide details
sufficient to enable and facilitate informed public comment during the
required public comment period." This obligation would, over time,
generate a body of publicly known policy judgments that would
promote (1) greater consistency from matter to matter; (2) greater
understanding on the part of the business community and their
counselors about required elements of acceptable merger remedies;
(3) greater acceptance of those elements at early stages of remedy
discussions; (4) more public scrutiny and dialogue about trade-offs
underlying agency decision-making; and, as a result of all of those
benefits, more effective remedy policies generally.
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"Confidentiality" is an overused excuse for past agency
resistance to explanations of the suggested kind. Agency desires to
retain maximum discretion, to minimize creation of "precedents" that
can be invoked by merging parties in subsequent cases, and to avoid
acknowledgment of weaknesses in investigative conclusions are parts
of the mix. An overriding reality is that many of the mergers that
become conditioned on acceptance of a settlement are neither
unqualifiedly anticompetitive nor unqualifiedly good for the world,
either prior to or after restructuring to meet agency concerns.
Complaint allegations on market definitions, entry barriers, and
competitive effects often appear clear and simple while masking
ambiguity and conflicting facts emerging from the underlying
investigation; conversely, the parties' efficiency claims often appear
clear and simple while masking considerable doubt as to whether they
will materialize. Predictions about both (1) the likely effects of the
merger without any remedy and (2) the effectiveness of the remedy
are almost always less secure and more debatable than press releases
suggest. There should be more openness about these uncertainties,
which will continue to be inevitable in a market economy as volatile
and complex as I now confront.
B. Early Considerationof Remedy Proposals
Section EIl rests on the proposition that it is desirable for the
agencies to encourage parties to proposed mergers presenting
significant market power risks to submit remedy proposals during the
initial HSR waiting period. To that end, the section sets forth
procedures under which (1) parties opting for early remedy
discussions can accompany their initial HSR filings with specified
documents and other information not ordinarily included with those
filings, along with specified undertakings related to remedy issues
and (2) the reviewing agency thereupon becomes committed to a
specified inquiry, dialogue, and schedule for meaningful early
exploration of an acceptable remedial solution. There is also in
Section M the prospect of some relaxation of the generally applicable
presumptions set forth in Section II and thus a greater degree of
flexibility in the negotiation of settlement terms. The agencies will
need to demonstrate meaningful openness to the use of this option and
meaningful receptiveness to relaxation of the Section In presumptions
in a significant number of cases if the business community is to have
confidence in it. Additional inducements to merging parties' election
of the Section 1I procedures include (1) the agencies' commitment
not to use any statements or proposals submitted by the parties in
these procedures as admissions of any kind in any subsequent
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litigation and (2) the agencies' agreement not to object if the parties
in any such litigation wish to present for court consideration the
adequacy of their proposed divestiture plan as part of their defense of
the proposed transaction. (Another factor militating in favor of
parties' use of these procedures in particular cases may be that the
parties are simultaneously involving similar procedures before the
European Commission, as discussed below.)
Section II seeks to overcome what, in many albeit not all
circumstances, can be undesirable obstacles to early remedy
discussions. Specifically, even when a merger may raise fairly
obvious antitrust issues at the outset of the review process, agency
reviewers may be reticent about and resistant to early, open, and
meaningful dialogue with merging parties' counsel about potential
concerns and how they might be addressed, preferring to retain all
prerogatives for future action; and merging parties' counsel may be
equally reticent about and resistant to early, open, and meaningful
dialogue with agency reviewers about these matters, preferring to
appear sure of the absence of any basis for enforcement concern and
to preserve the possibility that the deal will escape close agency
attention.
The result is too often exceptionally expensive and prolonged
Second Request investigations going all the way to their bitter end
This is sometimes
before remedy discussions even begin.
remedy discussions
"responsible"
that
ground
rationalized on the
cannot begin until "all the facts are in" and both sides know
everything there is to know about both sides' strengths and
weaknesses. It brings to mind the old story about the perfect being
the enemy of the good, disserving the interests of both the merging
parties and the public at large. 5
The Europeans have a better approach built into their system.
European Commission ("EC") procedures provide incentives for the
merging parties to proffer "undertakings" in the third week of the
phase-one review process; if that option is pursued, serious remedy
discussions ensue and, even if the phase-two period goes forward, the
expectation is that it will be short-lived and will evolve into a
reasonably quick resolution of the matter. If the undertakings option
is not pursued and the phase-two notice is then issued, a full phase-

15 The above comments should not be construed as implying that early fast-track
settlement negotiations never occur. I know there have been instances when agency staff and
merging parties' counsel have cooperated in producing mutually acceptable and effective
remedies at very early stages of the review process. My concern is that instances of this kind
are too rare, and the proposed guidelines are designed to encourage more frequent efforts in this
direction.
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two investigation becomes virtually unavoidable, and there is no
procedural device that allows it to be abbreviated in a material way.
I don't suggest that that is a perfect approach to this problem (or
that EC remedies are always ideal or better than their counterparts in
the U.S.). What is nonetheless quite appealing is the idea of
procedural incentives that bring both sides to remedy discussions at
an early point in the merger review process. Conversely, there should
be adverse consequences from tactical judgments by counsel and their
clients to "play out strings" and thereby force agencies as well as the
clients themselves to waste resources on unnecessarily extended
investigations.
On our side of the Atlantic, one of the reasons why there can be
more confidence in an early settlement than in one fashioned ten or
more months after a deal is announced is because of the harm done to
the overlap business of the company to be acquired during the
prolonged investigation period.
The business will inevitably
deteriorate as a result of customer uncertainty, employee defections,
and managerial inability to undertake capital investments and
otherwise pursue long-term strategies (often due to strictures on their
actions routinely built into merger agreements).
In short, a
meaningful divestiture to a suitable buyer announced within a few
months after the merger itself is announced is far more likely to be
successful in preserving competition within the affected market than
the same or similar divestiture announced many months later.
To the extent my proposal promotes early completion of merger
investigations with less burden to all parties involved, it advances an
objective that both Chairman Muris and Department of Justice
Antitrust Chief Charles James have vowed to pursue. As Chairman
Muris has observed: "we need to find ways to do our jobs more
efficiently"; merger investigations "take longer than necessary" and
"[w]e will try to expedite the process"; "[i]mproved communication is
part of the answer"; and both sides need "to join issue on the critical
aspects" of merger inquiries at earlier stages. 16 As Chief James
observed in his preview of the October, 2001 DOJ Merger Review
Process Initiative: "the agencies and the private bar could do a much
better job in the merger enforcement process if we acknowledge our
contributions to the problem and work to minimize the tactical
maneuvering and gamesmanship"; "[b]oth sides would benefit from
an orderly review period that has greater procedural certainty"; and,
to that end, he has announced a program under which the agency may
commit to "specific procedural agreements" that expedite the
16

Speech by Timothy Muris, supra note 6, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/

murisaba.htm.
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completion of merger reviews.17 Commitments to early remedy
discussions under conditions outlined in the proposed guidelines
could be a meaningful part of that program. AAI welcomes
comments and suggestions on all aspects of the proposed guidelines
attached to this paper.
PROPOSED HORIZONTAL MERGER REMEDY GUIDELINES

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

As set forth in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the
mandate of the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice and of the Federal Trade
Commission (hereafter "Agency" or "Agencies") in
the exercise of their horizontal merger enforcement
responsibilities is to prevent the consummation of
proposed mergers that may create, increase, or
facilitate the exercise of significant market power in
any relevant product or geographic market. At the
same time, however, the Agencies recognize that
proposed mergers presenting risks of significant
market power effects may also present prospects for
significant procompetitive efficiencies. This fact
underlines the reviewing Agency's responsibility to
work with parties to a proposed merger that presents
market power risks to fashion a consent order or
decree that eliminates the risks, then allows the
merger to go forward, and thereby ensures a postmerger environment at least as competitive as evident
in the pre-merger environment.

B.

Section II of these Guidelines establishes
presumptions regarding necessary elements of an
acceptable consent order or decree permitting such a
merger to proceed without further challenge. As
indicated therein, the Agencies accept the obligation
of public explanation whenever they accept a consent

1 Charles A. James, U.S. Department of Justice, Be Careful What You Wish For. Some
Thoughts on the Merger Review Process, Address Before ABA Antitrust Section Annual
Meeting, at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publilcspeeches/8764.htm (Aug. 7, 2001). See also
Sieberg, supra note 2. While the DOJ Initiative deals with some of the issues and ideas raised
in this article, many others are ignored, leaving open to further experience the question of
whether the Initiative goes far enough. Note that the DOJ Initiative was not jointly produced
with the FTC, which raises the possibility of inconsistent procedures at the two enforcement
agencies.
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order or decree in such a case that omits one or more
of these elements. Section III of these Guidelines
establishes conditions under which merging parties
may obtain early consideration of remedy proposals,
and provides incentives for merging parties to invoke
the procedures set forth therein, in the interests of
avoiding prolonged investigations and expediting
consummation of the parties' transactions. Both
sections address only risks associated with horizontal
overlaps, entailing elimination of actual or potential
competition between the merging parties. Market
power risks associated with vertical dimensions of a
transaction may require other kinds of relief that are
not addressed in these Guidelines.
II.

NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY

A.

A proposed merger presenting significant market
power risks should not be permitted to proceed
absent pre-consummation Agency acceptance of a
consent order or decree ensuring elimination of the
identified risks. An acceptable consent order or
decree for this purpose must address each horizontal
overlap between the merging parties that presents
significant market power risks. The reviewing
Agency will presume that the risks presented by any
such overlap area are not eliminated unless the relief
includes divestiture of all material tangible and
intangible assets used by one of the merging parties
to compete in that overlap area. The relief should
prevent any diminution of competition in each
affected product and geographic market with due
regard for all relevant dimensions of competitionprice, service, quality, innovation, and variety.

B.

The reviewing Agency will not presume that a
proposed divestiture encompassing less than an
ongoing business suffices to eliminate identified
risks absent execution of an acceptable contract with
an acceptable buyer prior to consummation of the
proposed merger. More specifically:
1.

For the contract to be acceptable, it must
provide adequate due diligence with respect
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to the assets in question, adequate incentives
for employees of the divested enterprise to
become employees of the buyer, restrictions
on the divesting company's reemployment of
those employees, prohibitions on the
divesting company's reacquisition of any
divested assets, and provisions for the
supply,
necessary
of
continuation
distribution, and other outside relationships.
2.

For the buyer to be acceptable, it must
possess demonstrable expertise, resources
and incentives sufficient to maintain the
competitive viability of the divested
enterprise, enjoying both scale and scope
economies comparable to those enjoyed by
the existing owner and thereby ensuring
preservation of effective competition in the
relevant market or markets of concern. The
buyer should be encouraged to submit a
proposed business plan for the Agency's
review in connection with the Agency's
consideration of the buyer's acceptability.
The plan should reflect a realistic strategy to
become a vigorous and successful competitor
in the relevant market or markets of concern
on a long-term basis.

3.

In appropriate cases, the Agency may require
retention of an independent investment
banker or other outside advisor at the parties'
expense to assist in assessing the
acceptability of both the contract terms and
the proposed buyer, in evaluating the merits
of the proposed business plan, and otherwise
in determining whether the proposed
divestiture can be expected to result in an
realistic
with
enterprise
independent
prospects for long-term financial and
competitive viability.

4.

The Agency will be sensitive to risks of
deterioration in assets and goodwill of the
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entity to be divested during the period
between announcement of the proposed
transaction
under
investigation
and
completion of the contemplated divestiture.
If any such material deterioration has
occurred, the Agency may require that it be
addressed and cured in an effective manner
in the divestiture plan.
5.

The reviewing Agency will not presume that
a proposed divestiture suffices to eliminate
identified risks absent commitments by both
the divesting party and the buyer of the assets
to be divested to submission of reports, in a
manner specified by the reviewing Agency,
on the effectiveness of the remedy,
particularly on whether it succeeded in
preserving competition in the relevant market
or markets of concern, two years after the
effective date of the applicable order or
decree.

6.

See the Appendix to these Guidelines for
additional
criteria
relevant
to
the
acceptability of a proposed divestiture plan.

C.

If the parties seek to consummate their merger prior
to consummation of the proposed divestiture, the
consent order or decree must include an acceptable
interim arrangement under which the enterprise to be
divested is held and operated separately from the
merged firm. To be acceptable, the arrangement
must include appointment of a suitable interim trustee
whose responsibility is to ensure that the assets to be
divested are appropriately maintained, that the
enterprise continues to compete independently during
the interim period, and that the divestiture occurs in a
manner consistent with the objectives of the consent
order or decree.

D.

Any consent order or decree that omits any of the
elements set forth in paragraphs A, B and C above
must include provisions for appointment of an

TOWARD GUIDELINES FOR MERGER REMEDIES

2001]

acceptable monitor trustee whose function will be (a)
to supervise compliance with all of the terms of the
order or decree, (b) report to the Agency on any
deficiencies in the compliance process, and (c) report
to the Agency on the effectiveness of the remedy,
particularly on whether it succeeded in preserving
competition in the relevant market or markets of
concern, one year after the effective date of the
applicable order or decree. Any such order or decree
must also include provisions enabling the Agency to
institute proceedings under which it may seek
additional relief, including the divestiture of specified
additional assets, in the event the Agency accepts the
monitor's findings of either deficiencies in the
compliance process or lack of effectiveness of the
remedy generally.
E.

The Agency must select or approve the interim
trustee under paragraph C and the monitor trustee
under paragraph D, the terms of a trust agreement
ensuring the trustee's fiduciary obligation to the
Agency, and terms under which the merging parties
commit to the trustee's compensation.

F.

In the event the Agency accepts a consent order or
decree that omits any of the elements set forth in
paragraphs A through E, the Agency will provide a
public explanation of the reasons for its
determination that omission of any such element or
elements is in the public interest. The explanation
will provide details sufficient to enable and facilitate
informed public comment during the required public
comment period.
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OPTION TO SUBMIT REMEDY PROPOSAL DURING OR
SHORTLY AFTER EXPIRATION OF INITIAL HSR WAITING
PERIOD

A.

The Agencies encourage parties to proposed
transactions presenting or likely to present significant
market power risks to submit remedy proposals
during or shortly after expiration of the initial HSR
waiting period. To that end, and provided that the
parties comply with the conditions set forth in
paragraph B below, the Agencies will (a) commit to
the procedures set forth in paragraph C below and (b)
abide by the terms of paragraphs D and E below.

B.

Parties that want to take advantage of the procedures
set forth below should accompany their initial HSR
filings with all of the following:
1.

Memorandum
providing
the
parties'
perspectives on horizontal overlaps and other
aspects of the transaction that may raise
antitrust issues, the parties' positions on
appropriate definitions of the relevant market
or markets for purposes of analysis of the
identified overlaps, and the parties' positions
on
market
conditions
and
other
considerations pertinent to assessment of the
proposed8 transaction's likely competitive
1
effects.

2.

Statement of commitment to full cooperation
with the reviewing Agency in an
investigation of the identified overlaps, other
identified aspects of the transaction that may
raise antitrust concerns, and of any other
issues that the reviewing Agency may wish
to pursue during the initial waiting period.

3.

Names and contact information on each
party's (a) ten largest customers and

18 The parties may also, at their option in that memorandum, identify remedies that may
be entertained in the event the reviewing Agency believes the proposed transaction does present
or is likely to present significant market power concerns. Alternatively, the parties may opt to
defer specific remedy proposals to later stages described in this section.
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(b) significant competitors in each identified
overlap area within the United States during
the most recent 12-month period.
4.

Each party's documents relating to
competitive effects of the transaction,
including business plans relating to each
identified overlap area and prepared during
the twenty-four months prior to the HSR
filings.

5.

Third-party market research reports or
analyses relating to each identified overlap
area, in either party's possession or control,
and prepared during the twenty-four months
prior to the HSR filings.
Each party will thereafter and throughout the
initial HSR waiting period promptly comply
with any requests from the reviewing Agency
for (a) additional documents and information,
whether relating to the identified overlap
areas or relating to other issues of potential
Agency interest and (b) interviews or
depositions of company officers or other
personnel.

C.

With regard to proposed transactions as to which the
parties comply with all of the provisions set forth in
paragraph B above, the Agencies commit to the
following procedures:
1.

Determination of which Agency will be the
reviewing Agency within five working days
of the commencement of the initial HSR
waiting period.

2.

Within the ensuing five working days after
that determination, a meeting between the
assigned staff of the reviewing Agency and
the parties' counsel to share initial reactions
to the filings and the proposed transaction

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:211

generally, and to propose an investigation
plan as described in subparagraph 3 below.
3.

Priority attention during the initial waiting
period to an investigation plan that enables
early determination of (a) whether horizontal
overlaps may present sufficient concerns to
warrant remedial conditions to the proposed
transaction;
and, if so,
(b) whether
appropriate remedial conditions can be
fashioned and accepted without the1 9need for
a full Second Request investigation.

4.

Advice to the parties no later than two
working days before expiration of the initial
waiting period on the staff's findings to date
and, if the findings indicate that horizontal
overlaps may present sufficient concerns to
warrant remedial conditions to the proposed
transaction, whether the staff can entertain an
early remedy proposal.2 °

5.

Based on the advice provided under
subparagraph 4 above, the parties may either
(a) withdraw and refile their HSR filings,
thereby restarting the initial waiting period or
(b) opt to continue cooperation with the
previously adopted investigation plan in the
event the reviewing Agency proceeds to issue
a Second Request. The parties may also,
within the ensuing ten working days, submit
a remedy proposal. If the parties opt for
either (a) or (b) above, the reviewing Agency
will commit to continued priority attention to
the investigation plan. If the parties submit a
remedy proposal within the period indicated
above, the reviewing Agency will promptly

19 The investigation plan would be devised in consultation with the merging parties and
would include: (a) document and information requests to the parties and third parties and (b)
depositions or interviews of the parties and third parties.
20 The reviewing Agency must retain the discretion to determine that further, in-depth
investigation is required before any remedy proposal may be entertained. This may, for
example, be the case when there may be either horizontal or vertical issues beyond those
previously identified by the parties that may warrant close scrutiny.
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respond to it, advise as to whether it can be
the basis for resolution of outstanding
concerns and, if so, proceed with expedited
negotiations with regard to it.
D.

The elements of an acceptable divestiture remedy set
forth in Section II of these Guidelines will generally
be required for an acceptable remedy under this
Section ImE. Where other adequate safeguards are
provided, however, the reviewing agency may not
apply all of the presumptions set forth in Section II,
i.e., it may not presume that all of those specified
elements are required for a proposal to be acceptable
under this Section IIl. In short, the reviewing
Agency may be more receptive to less stringent
provisions or alternative kinds of safeguards in
remedies presented under this Section III in light of
the benefits from earlier resolution of outstanding
concerns and earlier implementation of any required
divestiture relief.

E.

The Agencies recognize that, despite best efforts to
resolve concerns presented by a proposed transaction
under Section Ill of these Guidelines, a mutually
acceptable resolution may not emerge and the parties
may ultimately opt to defend their transaction in
litigation. In that event, no party's statements,
proposals or other actions taken in accordance with
Section Ill of these Guidelines will be used as an
admission or otherwise used against or to the
prejudice of the parties' defense of their transaction
in any such ensuing litigation. On the other hand,
should the parties wish to litigate the defensibility of
their proposed transaction as modified by their
proposed divestiture plan, the Agency challenging the
proposed transaction will not object to the court's
consideration of the adequacy of the divestiture plan
in its adjudication of the Agency's objections to the
transaction at issue. Specifically, the Agencies will
waive any objections to admissibility under the
Federal Rules of Evidence should the parties opt to
present their divestiture plan as part of their defense
of the transaction at issue.
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APPENDIX

Acceptable divestiture must result in preservation of the state of
competition in all affected product and geographic markets and all
relevant dimensions of competition prior to the announcement of the
proposed merger, with due allowance for any changes in the state of
competition that would predictably have occurred absent the
announcement.
The state of competition resulting from the proposed divestiture
may be determined by reference to characteristics affecting the
competitive force of the proposed post-divestiture entity. The
relevant characteristics include resources, incentives, and structure of
the post-divestiture entity.
Resource characteristics may be divided into operations and
finance criteria. Operations criteria include the adequacy of the
entity's labor force, its wage levels and union contracts, materials
costs, management expertise, access to related functions (e.g.,
distribution channels), and any necessary intangible assets. Finance
criteria include its balance sheet strength, access to financial markets,
and likely resilience over foreseeable contingencies.
Incentives characteristics include the full independence of the
new entity from its predecessor, together with a business plan that
makes clear the motivation of new management to act in the interests
of its own shareholders. The business plan must have realistic
prospects of success.
Structural characteristics include the entity's range of internal
activities (e.g., manufacturing, research, marketing), its size or market
share, and the scope or range of output offerings.
The proposed post-divestiture entity need not duplicate each
individual characteristic of the pre-divestiture entity so long as the
post-divestiture entity will as a whole replicate the competitive force
of the pre-merger entity in all affected product and geographic
markets and in all relevant dimensions of competition. In situations,
however, where the pre-divestiture entity is recognized as a
"maverick" in pricing, as a particularly significant source of
innovation, or as a firm otherwise making a unique contribution to the
competitive dynamics of the affected market or markets, there must
be some confidence that the post-divestiture entity will possess and
exhibit similar characteristics.

